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The Nationality of Claims Principle of
Public International Law and the Helms-
Burton Act
By ROBERT L. MUSE.
I. Introduction
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD) of
19961 seeks to collapse the economy of Cuba and thereby force a radical
and if necessary an even violent transformation of that country's political
and social institutions.2 Titles I and IV of the Helms-Burton Act are
the means to that end. To achieve institutional collapse in Cuba, both
Titles III and IV are intended to deter foreign investment in that country
by penalizing investors in expropriated Cuban properties-even if those
properties were expropriated by the government of Cuba from Cuban
citizens.3 It is this particular feature of the Helms-Burton Act-its viola-
tion of the nationality of claims principle of public international
law-that is the subject of this Article.
* District of Columbia Bar;, Barrister-at-Law (Middle Temple), Muse & Associ-
ates, Washington D.C. Mr. Muse advises clients on aspects of the Helms-Burton Act.
The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the author's firm or its clients. Portions of this Article appear in The
LIBERTAD Act: Implementation and International Law: Hearing Before the Senate Sub-
comm. on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. 58-76
(July 30, 1996) (testimony of Robert L. Muse).
1. Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996), § 301 et seq. (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§6021-91 (1997)) [hereinafter "Helms-Burton Act"].
2. Richard Nuccio, President Clinton's former special advisor on Cuba policy has
said, "Under the Helms-Burton Act, the basic model of change in Cuba is societal col-
lapse leading to a violent upheaval." U.S. Policy on Cuba Criticized: Two Fonner Aides
Blame Clinton, MIAMI HERA, Apr. 21, 1997, at 8A.
3. As Senator Phil Gramm has explained during debate on Senator Helms's
LIBERTAD bill: "The effective result of [this legislation] will be that private investors
will think two and three times before they bring their investment money to Castro's
Cuba." CONG. REc. 1481 (daily ed. March 5, 1996). An important impetus for the
Helms-Burton Act was the perceived vulnerability of the Cuban economy, and, hence,
the government of Cuba itself, in the aftermath of the dissolution of Cuba's trading links
with the former Eastern Bloc.
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Under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, "traffickers" in "confis-
cated" properties in Cuba are subject to treble damages liability in U.S.
federal courts.4 Under Title IV, such traffickers are to be denied entry
into the United States. Lawsuits may be brought against "traffickers"
under Title III (and exclusions of those traffickers from the United States
may be sought under Title IV) by "United States nationals," who "own
the claims" to properties in Cuba "confiscated" by the government of
Cuba on or after January 1, 1959.6 The Helms-Burton Act defines the
term "U.S. national" as "any U.S. citizen,"- that is, anyone who is at pre-
sent a U.S. citizen.7 It warrants emphasis that the Helm:s-Burton Act
does not require that a Title III litigant have been a U.S. citizen at the
time of property loss in Cuba. The effect of this provision of the statute
is to give naturalized Cuban Americans retroactive rights under U.S. law
to properties lost to them in a foreign country before they became U.S.
citizens.
As will be discussed below, Cuban American claims to "confis-
cated" properties in Cuba have no basis in international law and were in-
cluded in the Helms-Burton Act only in order to produce a global mora-
torium on investment in Cuba. The objective of such a moratorium is,
again, the engineered "meltdown" of Cuba's economy.8 When viewed
4. See Helms-Burton Act, § 302. A Title III litigant is entitled, under section
302(1)(A) of the Helms-Burton Act, to recover monetary "damages" from a "trafficker"
in an amount equal to whichever is greater, "...the fair market value of that property [i.e.
the property in Cuba to which a litigant "owns the claim"], calculated as being either the
current value of the property, or the value of the property when confiscated, plus inter-
est." A further provision of the statute, section 302 (a)(3), allows for the essentially
automatic trebling of the "money damages" available under Title III. The word "traf-
ficking" is defined to include such things as to "control.. .manage, use or otherwise ac-
quire or hold an interest" in "confiscated" properties in Cuba. See id. at § 4(13).
5. Title IV directs the Secretary of State to exclude from entry into the United
States, "officers, principals or shareholders with a controlling interest of an entity which
is trafficking in property [in Cuba], a claim to which is owned by a U.S. national." See
Helms-Burton Act, § 401.
6. Id. at § 302(a) (1) (A). The Helms-Burton Act defines "confiscated" to mean,
simply, "the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by the Cuban Government of
ownership or control of property.. .without the property having been returned or adequate
and effective compensation having been provided." Id. at § 4(4).
7. See Helms-Burton Act, § 4(15)(A).
8. Title II of the Helms-Burton Act sets out the details of the new Ciban nation that
is intended to be created and overseen by the U.S. Congress. See Helms-Burton Act, §§
201-07.
[Vol. 20:777
The Nationality of Claims Principle and Helms-Burton
from this perspective, it is obvious that the Helms-Burton Act is really a
foreign policy exercise thinly disguised as jurisprudence. Explicit cor-
roboration that this is the case was provided on June 14, 1995, when
Ignacio Sanchez, a Cuban American lawyer from Miami, appeared be-
fore a U.S. Senate subcommittee to argue that, "Inclusion of Cuban
Americans [in Title III]... is imperative to accomplish the foreign policy
goals [of the Helms-Burton Act]." 9 According to Mr. Sanchez, certified
claimants (i.e. non-Cuban American potential plaintiffs under Title III)
"represent at most 5 percent of the productive properties in Cuba." 1o He
went on to say:
Including the Cuban Americans provides a much greater coverage of
property and therefore creates a more limited pool of potential invest-
ments in Cuba. By limiting foreign investment in Cuba, the bill detri-
mentally impacts upon the regime's chances to prolong its stay in
power and therefore the foreign policy objective is accomplished."
(Emphasis added).
We have seen that the claims of Cuban Americans were considered
integral to the achievement of the Helms-Burton Act's foreign policy
objectives. The question that this Article will address is this: May the
United States provide support, in the form of Titles III and IV of the
Helms-Burton Act, to the claims of non-U.S. nationals (i.e. Cuban
Americans) at the time of their foreign property losses? 2 The answer is
an unequivocal "No."
9. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act: Hearing Before the Senate Sub-
comm. on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 128
(June 1995) (testimony of Ignacio Sanchez).
10. The term "certified claimants" refers to the 5,911 corporations and individuals
that possess claims against Cuba certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
in the late 1960s. See FOREIGN CLAIS SETrLBEMNr COMMiSSIO,4 FRNAL REPORT ON THE
CUBAN CLAIMS PROGRAM (1972). As will be described, in order to even file their claims
the certified claimants were required to demonstrate that they held U.S. nationality at the
time their properties in Cuba were expropriated.
11. Id.
12. Titles III and IV of the Helms-Burton Act are a form of state support for the
claims of U.S. nationals vis-a-vis Cuba. Although such claims are usually espoused by
the Executive Branch of the U.S. government (i.e. the Department of State) and, hence,
are broadly described as being subject to "diplomatic protection," state support for the
claims of a country's nationals may take a variety of forms. See FREDEMCK S. DuNN,
THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS: A STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 20
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II. The Nationality of Claims Principle of Public International
Law
A. The Principle
The "nationality of claims" principle of public international law is
this: If international law is to apply to a governmental taking of property,
anyone seeking state support for a claim of compensation for the taking
must occupy- at the time the property was actually taken-the status of a
non-national of the government that took the property. 3 By contrast, a
governmental taking of property in the form of, for example, eminent
domain proceedings, nationalizations, forfeitures, or any other expro-
priations ordinarily is a matter of purely domestic jurisdiction. 4 Again,
(1932) ("In the present work we are concerned primarily with the practice or institution
of protection itself, and not with any particular method by which the legal obligations
thereunder may be enforced.. .the term "diplomatic protection" is here used as a generic
term covering the general subject of protection of citizens and their property abroad, in-
cluding those cases in which other than diplomatic means may be resorted to in the en-
forcement of obligations."). See generally EDWIN BORCHARD, "THE DIPLOMATIC
PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD: Tim INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CLAIMS (1915), where
frequent reference is made to States' "interpositions," vis-h-vis other States, on behalf of
their citizens. Titles III and IV of the Helms-Burton Act constitute a statutory "interpo-
sition" of the United States in support of the international claims of certain of its citizens.
13. See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 512 (Jennings, ed., 9th ed. 1992), where
the distinguished British jurist, Professor Robert Jennings, puts the principle in these
terms: "From the time of the occurrence of the injury until the making of the award the
claim continuously and without interruption must have belonged to a parson or to a se-
ries of persons having the nationality of the State by whom it is put forward." This
means a State cannot support vis-h-vis another State any but the claim!; of its nationals
who, of course, were aliens in relation to the expropriating state.
14. A narrow exception to the rule in a state's taking of the properties of its citizens
may exist where the taking is an incident in the victimization of a peison on racial or
ethnic grounds. See, e.g., Oppenheimer v. Cattermore, App. Cas. 249 (1976), where the
House of Lords refused to recognize a Nazi law which had deprived a German Jew of
both his property and nationality because of his race. As Lord Cross of Chelsea said, "A
Judge should, of course, be very slow to refuse to give effect to the legislation of a for-
eign state in any sphere in which, according to accepted principles of international law,
the foreign state has jurisdiction .... But what we are concerned with here is legislation
which takes away without compensation from a section of the citizen body singled out on
racial grounds all their property on which the state passing the legislation can lay its
hands and, in addition, deprives them 'of their citizenship. To my mind a law of this sort
constitutes so grave an infringement of human rights that the courts of this country ought
to refuse to recognize it as a law at all." Id. at 277-78. No claim has ever been made that
properties were expropriated in Cuba on the grounds of race or ethnicity. Titles III and
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for international law to apply to a governmental taking of property, the
injured party quite simply must be a foreign national at the time of prop-
erty loss.
II. The Basis of the Principle
In the Case of Lithgow and Others, the European Court of Human
Rights, held that, "purely as a matter of general international law, the
principles in question apply solely to non-nationals." 15
The Lithgow case offers a partial explanation for the longstanding
distinction made in international law between nationals and non-
nationals (i.e. aliens) in cases involving governmental property takings:
Especially as regards a taking of property effected in the context of a
social reform, there may well be good grounds for drawing a distinc-
tion between nationals and non-nationals as far as compensation is
concerned. To begin with, non-nationals are more vulnerable to do-
mestic legislation: unlike nationals, they will generally have played no
part in the election or designation of its authors nor have been con-
sulted on its adoption. Secondly, although a taking of property must
always be effected in the public interest, different considerations may
apply to nationals and non-nationals and there may well be legitimate
reasons for requiring nationals to bear a greater burden in the public
interest than non-nationals.
16
There are at least three other bases, apart from the reasoning of
Lithgow, for the "nationality of claims" principle.
First, the protection of international law is afforded alien-owned
properties in order to encourage transnational investment. In this regard
it is instructive to note that Article 1101 of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) accords a higher degree of protection to in-
vestments of signatory countries' nationals (Canadian, Mexican and
U.S.) than is available to those nationals if their own governments should
IV of the Helms-Burton Act are, of course, not limited to claims alleging violations of
fundamental human rights, but rather applies to all Cuban governmental takings of prop-
erty where "adequate and effective" compensation is not paid.
15. 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986) at 113 (emphasis added). Lithgow involved a
claim by British citizens that a U.K. statute which nationalized their property violated the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
16. Id. at§ 116.
1997]
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take their properties. 17  The reason for such protectiveness of alien-
owned property is obvious-the encouragement of foreign private in-
vestment within the territories of NAFTA nations.
Second, the nationality of claims principle is underpinned by a gen-
eral international rule of law in the area of state responsibility for inju-
ries to aliens. The World Court articulated the basis of such support in
1924 in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case:
"It is an elementary principle of international law that a state is. entitled
to protect its subjects when injured by acts contrary to international
law committed by another state. By taking up the case of one of its
subjects... a state is in reality asserting its own rights-its rights to en-
sure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international
law. ,1
8
A third reason for the rule that a nation may, under international
law, support only the claims of those who are its nationals at the time
of property loss, is the avoidance of offense to other nations that would
arise from meddling (even with the best of intentions) in their domestic
affairs. A striking example of the heightened sensitivities that exist in
this respect was provided by U.S. Secretary of State Hamilton Fisk in
1874: "It would be a monstrous doctrine, which this government would
not tolerate for a moment, that a citizen of the United States might
deem himself injured by the authorities of the United States or any
state, and could, by transferring his allegiance to another power, confer
upon that power the right to inquire into the legality of the proceedings
by which he may have been injured while a citizen."19
17. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 107
Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter "NAFTA"].
18. 1924 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 2. Borchard approaches the matter from this point of
view when he quotes Vattel to the following effect: "The interest of the state in protect-
ing its citizens abroad is justified upon the theory formulated by Em-rich deVattel:
'Whoever uses a citizen ill, indirectly offends the state, which is bound to protect its citi-
zen;...' The indirect injury which the state sustains by an injury to one of its citizens
warrants bringing into operation the state's protective machinery." See BORCHARD, Su-
pra note 12, at 351.
19. Letter of April 8, 1874, reprinted in 6 JOHN MOORE, A DIGEsT OF NTERNATIONAL
LAW 637 (1906).
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I. The Conclusiveness of the Nationality of Claims Principle
There is not the slightest question as to whether the nationality of
claims principle is a rule of customary international law. The British ju-
rist Professor Gillian White has written in her authoritative study, the
Nationalisation of Foreign Property, that " ... deprivation of rights of a
proprietary nature is a prerequisite to any international claim arising out
of a measure of nationalization or confiscation... The other vital pre-
requisite is that the owner of the nationalized property must have been
an alien vis-b-vis the nationalizing State at the time of the meas-
ure ....
,20
The additional treatise authority which follows on this point has
been selected chiefly for its contemporaneity, but it should be stressed
that dozens of comparable references exist-all in full agreement as to the
conclusiveness of the nationality of claims principle of public interna-
tional law. For example, Ian Brownlie states that " ... the relevant na-
tionality must exist at the time of injury... ,,;21 Malcolm Shaw notes
that "... . the nationality must exist at the date of the injury.. . ";22 and
Werner Levi writes, "... . the person must be a national of the state be-
fore that state can claim damages .... There is little doubt that the per-
son must have possessed the nationality of the state when the injury oc-
curred.."z
IV. United States Practice With Respect to The Nationality of
Claims Principle of Public International Law
A. Congressional Branch Adherence to the Nationality of Claims
Principle of Public International Law
When Congress enacted the Cuban Claims Act in 1964, it gave spe-
cific authorization to the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC)
20. See GnLiAN Wi'm, THm NATIONALiSATIOo OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 50 (1962)
(emphasis added).
21. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIc INTERNATiONAL LAw 482 (3rd ed.
1990).
22. See MALCOtM SHAw, INTERNATIONALLAw 506 (3rd ed. 1991).
23. See WERNER LEvi, COmiPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw 245-46 (1979).
19971
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to determine "the amount and validity of claims by nationals of the
United States against the Government of Cuba... for losses resulting
from the nationalization, expropriation, intervention, or other taking
of... property... owned ... by nationals of the United States." 24 Sec-
tion 504(a) of the Cuban Claims Act further states that "A claim shall not
be considered under Section 503(a) of this title unless the property on
which the claim was based was owned.., by a national of the United
States on the date of loss... . "25
There was nothing unusual in the requirement that claimants avail-
ing themselves of the processes of the FCSC be U.S. nationals at the time
of their property losses in Cuba. With respect to section 504(a), the leg-
islative history of the Cuban Claims Act says merely that it "follows the
pattern of previous U.S. claims programs [in providing] that a property
claim shall not be considered unless the property involved was directly
or indirectly owned by a U.S. national on the date of the loss .... ,26
Congress has consistently followed the nationality of claims princi-
ple of international law when it has authorized claims programs on be-
half of U.S. citizens against nations other than Cuba. Working under the
auspices of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission has conducted programs involving Yugo-
slavia, Panama, Poland, China, Ethiopia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Italy, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Vietnam,
the German Democratic Republic and Cuba. In not one of these pro-
grams has Congress required the Commission to violate international law
24. Cuban Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 88-666, 78 Stat. 1110 (1964), codified at 22
U.S.C. § 1643 et seq., at § 503(a) (emphasis added).
25. Id. at § 504(a) (emphasis added).
26. S. REP. No. 88-1521, at 2 (1964). The Cuban Claims Act, was simply following
international law-which is explicitly made controlling in the determination of claims un-
der the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949: "In the decision of claims under the
Title, the Commission shall apply ... applicable principles of international law, justice
and equity." 22 U.S.C. § 1623(a)(2). The Foreign Claims Commission in determining
claims against Cuba was mindful of the statutory requirement that its deci3ions comport
with international law. See, e.g., In the Matter of Lisle Corporation, F.C.S.C. Dec. No.
CU267 (1967) at 4 ("..... the Commission is expressly directed by Con:ress to apply
'the applicable principles of international law'....") (citing the International Claims
Settlement Act of 1949).
27. See generally FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 32-33 (1990) [hereinafter "F.C.S.C. REPORT"].
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and consider the claims of non-U.S. nationals at time of property loss.
In most of the FCSC claims programs referred to above, non-U.S.
nationals at time of property loss have, at some point, sought to be in-
cluded in the programs and have petitioned Congress to that effect. Con-
gress and the Executive Branch have been in consistent accord in reject-
ing the inclusion of claims of anyone other than U.S. nationals at time of
loss. The State Department summarized, in terms which follow, the ba-
sis for the consistent refusal of both Congress and the Executive Branch
to violate the international law of claims:
Over the last several years bills have been introduced in the Congress
to permit persons who were not citizens of the United States at the time
of loss to receive compensation out of vested Bulgarian, Hungarian and
Romanian assets for nationalizations in those countries. Bills have also
been introduced to permit such persons to share in the proceeds ob-
tained from lump-sum settlement agreements with the Governments of
Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. Additionally, bills were introduced
to permit such persons with nationalization claims against Czechoslo-
vakia to share in the proceeds of the sale of a steel mill of the Czecho-
slovakian Government. Neither the executive branch nor the Congress
favored any of such bills and none were enacted.
The Department is not aware of a single instance in which persons
who were not citizens of the United States at the time of loss were
permitted to share in any funds paid by foreign governments in settle-
ment of claims for the nationalization or other taking of property. Pay-
ment of such claims would establish a new and novel precedent to the
detriment of nationals of the United States having valid claims under
principles of international law. The net result of this would be that one
category of claimants would be paying the losses of another category.
In the Department's view, such a result is highly undesirable.2 3
As will be described below, in only two instances-involving
Czechoslovakia and Italy-have the claims of non-United States nationals
at date of loss been said to have received favorable treatment by Con-
gress.
The case of Italy was simply a matter of more money being avail-
able under a claims settlement agreement than there were qualified U.S.-
28. Letter to Senator Alan Cranston from Fabian A. Kwiatek (February, 1975), re-
printed in 1975 DIGEsT, at 484- 485.
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national claimants to receive it-so the rule requiring U.S. nationality at
time of loss was relaxed in the case of Italy solely in order to allow cer-
tain U.S. citizens to receive a share of surplus settlement funds. How-
ever, no claims were ever asserted by the United States against Italy on
behalf of non-U.S. nationals at time of property loss, so there was no de-
parture from either international claims law or the U.S. policy and prac-
tice in adhering to that law.
In the case of Czechoslovakia, Congress determined, after reviewing
a complex set of circumstances, that a group of naturalized U.S. citizens
(who had previously been Czech citizens) in fact held American nation-
ality at the date of their losses and accordingly allowed them ex gratia
payments from a settlement fund. Again, as was true of the Italian
claims program, the favorable treatment extended by Congress to a small
number of Czechoslovakian Americans constituted no departure from
international claims law or practice.
The analysis of the Italian and Czechoslovakian programs which
follows will highlight the differences between those programs and the
impermissible State support given by the United States to Cuban Ameri-
cans claims when Titles III and IV of the Helms-Burton Act were en-
acted.
(1) The Case of Italy
Pursuant to the Lombardo Agreement of 1947, Italy paid the United
States $5 million to settle the war-related claims of U.S. nationals.29
When the claims of U.S. nationals at date of loss were actually computed
by the FCSC, the total amount certified, including interest, came to about
$3.7 million. Because there was no reversion clause in the Lombardo
Agreement, any excess money not distributed would have had to been
deposited in the miscellaneous receipts account of the Treasury. In order
to avoid this result, monies were distributed to several non-US. nationals
(at date of their property losses in Italy) who were able to prove that they
29. See S. REP. 836-90, at 4-5 (1968). The Italian claims program was; conducted on
the basis that a lump sum agreement was negotiated between Italy and the United States
for the wartime losses of U.S. citizens before the extent of those losses was more than
very approximately known. The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission then deter-
mined the proved value of the claims of U.S. nationals against Italy, which turned out to
be less than the amount negotiated between the U.S. and Italy. Id.
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had become U.S. citizens through naturalization by 1955. "0
Some years later, the Senate explained the basis for its decision to
allow Italian Americans naturalized by 1955 to participate in the pro-
gram:
The Commission has adhered to the familiar rule of international law
that, in order to be eligible to receive an award under the programs
over which it has jurisdiction the claimant must show that his claim
was owned by a national or nationals of the United States ... from the
time it arose until the date of filing with the Commission.
It should be noted that this principle was consistently followed by
the Committee on Foreign Relations in reporting legislation establish-
ing the claims funds mentioned above. The only time the committee
deviated from this principle was in 1958, when it approved an amend-
ment relating to the Italian claims fund. The justification for making an
exception in that case is explained in the following excerpts from the
committee report (S. Rept. No. 1794, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.):
The committee has added a new section to S.357 which has the ef-
fect of modifying Section 304 of the International Claims Settle-
ment Act, as regards claimants against the Italian Claims Fund. As
the committee has already noted, the existing practice in claims
legislation, and one which the Committee endorses, limits claims
to those based upon American ownership of a property at the time
of loss and continuously thereafter until the time of the filing of
the claim. This practice is essential if those who clearly have first
claim, as far as the United States is concerned, to the limited funds
available are to be compensated for their losses. Further, it should
be noted in this connection that the claims of Americans who be-
came citizens after their loss occurred usually are still valid
against the responsible foreign government.
However, a special situation has arisen as regards the Italian
Claims Funds. In this instance, under the Lombardo Agreement
the Italian Government made a lump-sum settlement with the
United States Government for the outstanding claims of American
citizens. It now appears that the Italian fund will be more than
adequate to reimburse all claimants 100 cents on the dollar for
losses of property which was American-owned at the time of loss
and continuously thereafter.
30. See 22 U.S.C. § 1641c.
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At the same time, however, there are some Americans who were
not citizens at the time of loss of their property, and, hence, in ac-
cordance with the general practice are not eligible to file valid
claims against the Italian Claims Fund. But these citizens are also
stopped from pressing their claims against Italy because of the
terms of the Lombardo Agreement. They are, in short, left at the
present time without legal remedy.
In these circumstances, the committee has made provision for
their claims to be considered as against the Italian Claims Fund,
only, however, if after all valid claimants against Italy who were
citizens at the time of loss have been fully reimbursed, some
money remains in this fund. There is no cost involved in this pro-
cedure to the United States. Nor does the procedure do violence to
the priority of right which as a matter of general practice should
be maintained for those who were citizens at the time of loss.3 1
At no time was a claim made by the United States on Italy on behalf
of non-U.S. nationals at time of property losses. The Italian claims pro-
gram has, accordingly, no relevance to international law, or, for that
matter, United States policy and practice with respect to that law. In
distinct contrast, Title I of the Helms-Burton Act effectively reopens
the Cuban claims program to allow non-U.S. nationals (i.e. Cuban na-
tionals) at date of loss to assert directly, in U.S. federal courts, claims
against the government of Cuba that have no basis in international law.
(2) The Case of Czechoslovakia
As indicated above, on only one other occasion-involving Czecho-
slovakia-has Congress been said to have allowed non-United States na-
tionals at time of loss to receive compensation under a Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission program. As will be explained below, (1) Con-
gress specifically found in reopening the Czech program to a small group
of naturalized Czechoslovakian Americans that this group actually held
U.S. nationality at time of their losses; (2) the compensation paid this
group was explicitly made ex gratia; (3) Congress expressly found that
the circumstances pertaining to this small group of claimants were "ex-
traordinary" and therefore, did "not establish any precedent for future
31. See S. REP. No. 836-90, supra note 29, at 5-6.
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claims negotiations or payments;" and (4) Congress reaffirmed "the prin-
ciple and practice of the United States to seek compensation from for-
eign governments on behalf only of persons who were nationals of the
United States at the time they sustained losses."
In grasping what Congress meant to do and actually did in the Czech
claims program, it is important to understand from the outset that the ex-
propriation of property in postwar Czechoslovakia involved two dis-
tinctly different episodes. In 1945, President Befies nationalized various
Czech-owned properties with public assurances of fair and just compen-
sation.3 3 On February 26, 1948 the Communist Party took power and re-
pudiated the compensation promises of its the Befies government.3 In the
meantime, a small number of Czechs had been naturalized in the United
States between the date of the original expropriation of their properties
in Czechoslovakia by the Befies government and the date of the repudia-
tion of the promise to compensate them by the Communist government.
In reopening the Czech claims program in 1981 to allow for a measure of
compensation to these claimants, Congress said:
These claimants-the so-called "Befies" claimants-were U.S. nationals
by February 26, 1948, when the Communists took power in Czecho-
slovakia. Action, however, had been taken against some or all of their
properties by the previous government of Edward Befies, albeit with
public promises by that government of fair and just compensation ....
The committee believes... that actions against property accompanied
by promise of compensation should not, in this case, have been treated
as takings, and that, in fact, the properties of these claimants were
taken by the Communist government when that government took power
and repudiated the promises of compensation made by the govern-
ment.
35
Ex gratia payments were accordingly authorized by Congress to be
made to persons who met the following requirements: (1) their property
was expropriated by the pre-February 1948 goyernment of President
32. See Czechoslovakian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-127, 95 Stat. 1675
(1981), codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1642 et seq. (1982), at § 6(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
33. See Dayton v. Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, 834 F.2d 203, 204 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
34. ld.
35. H.R. REP. No. 97-385, at 9 (1981) (emphasis added).
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Befies on or after January 1, 1945 and before January 26, 1948; (2) they
had become U.S. nationals by February 26, 1948; and (3) their previous
claims were denied by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission solely
on the ground that "such property was not owned by a person who was a
national of the United States on the date of such nationalization or tak-
ing."
36
It should be emphasized that Congress did not intend that the ex
gratia payments made to the Befies claimants be seen to constitute a de-
parture from established United States policy and practice in adhering to
the nationality of claims principle of public international law:
... the ex gratia payment hereinafter provided to certain claimants,
who were otherwise excluded from sharing in this claims settlement
under general-accepted principles of international law and United
States practice, is justified only by the extraordinary circumstances of
this case and does not establish any precedent for future claims nego-
tiations or payments.
37
The Congress reaffirms the principle and practice of tie United
States to seek compensation from foreign governments on behalf only
of persons who were nationals of the United States at the time they
sustained losses by the nationalization or other taking of property by
those foreign governments. In making payments under this section, the
Congress does not establish any precedent for future claims pay-
ments.
38
36. See Czechoslovakian Claims Settlement Act, supra note 32, at § 6(b). The Befies
claimants ended up receiving approximately 12% of the principal value, as determined by
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, of their lost properties. See Dayton, 834
F.2d at 204. By contrast, U.S. nationals at date of loss received 100% of the principal
value of their properties, i.e., $74.55 million in compensation against certified claims in
the total principal amount of $72.61 million. See F.C.S.C. REPORT, supra note 27, at 33
nn. 3-4.
37. See Czechoslovakian Claims Settlement Act, supra note 32, at § 4(a). Congress
in using the expression ex gratia could not have made the nature of its action with re-
spect to the Befies claimants much clearer. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
provides the following definition: "Ex GRATIA: out of grace; as a matter of grace, favor,
or indulgence; gratuitous. A term applied to anything accorded as a favor; as distin-
guished from that which may be demanded ex debito, as a matter of right."
38. See Czechoslovakian Claims Settlement Act, supra note 32, at § 6(a)(2)(B).
[Vol. 20:777
The Nationality of Claims Principle and Helms-Burton
B. United States Executive Branch Adherence to the Nationality of
Claims Principle of Public International Law
In reverse chronological order, several of the United States Depart-
ment of State's pronouncements on the subject of the nationality of
claims principle of international law will be reviewed:
Under well-established principles of international law... the United
States cannot espouse claims against foreign governments for injuries
inflicted upon persons who were not U.S. citizens at the time of the
injury .... [U]nder international law the date of taking is fixed by the
date of the expropriation decrees and/or the date of physical sei-
39
zure ....
In a February 6, 1975 letter to Senator Alan Cranston, an Assistant
Legal Adviser for International Claims at the Department of State ex-
plained the U.S. government's policy of adherence to the principles of
international law in the following terms:
The Department is not aware of any legal or other valid reason why
persons who were not American citizens when their properties were
taken should share in the proceeds of lump-sum settlements with per-
sons who were American citizens when their properties were taken.
It is now and has always been the policy of the United States Gov-
ernment not to permit citizens of the United States who did not have
that status at the time of loss to share in lump sums paid by foreign
governments in settlement of claims for the nationalization or other
taking of property. This policy rests upon the universally accepted
principle of international law that a state does not have the right to ask
another state to pay compensation to it for losses sustained by persons
who were not its citizens at the time of loss.
40
39. Letter to Congress from Richard Fairbanks, Assistant Secretary of State for Con-
gressional Relations (Oct. 2, 1981), reprinted in S. Rep. No. 97-211, at 4-5 (1981).
The letter addressed the issue of proposed legislation pertaining to Czechoslovakia.
40. Kwiatek letter, supra note 28. There can be no doubt that the United States gov-
ernment considered its adherence to the nationality of claims principle compelled by in-
ternational law. In a 1959 memorandum prepared by the Office of the Assistant Legal
Adviser for International Claims setting out the views of the Department of State con-
cerning the requisite nationality of claimants, the following treatise authority, among
others, was offered in support of the principle that one must be an alien at the time one's
property is taken by a foreign government for international law to apply; OPPENHEI'S
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In 1961, an Assistant Secretary of State wrote to Congressman Mor-
ris Udall to offer the following pronouncement:
... It has been the long-standing practice of the Department to decline
to espouse claims which were not owned by United States citizens at
the time of loss or damage. This practice rests upon the universally ac-
cepted principle of international law that a state does not have the right
to ask another state to pay compensation to it for losses or damages
sustained by persons who were not its citizens at the time of loss or
damage.
4 1
In a 1959 memorandum of international law pertaining to the issue
of nationality of claims, the Department of State said:
There is no doubt that generally accepted principles of international
law and practice require that a claim be continuously owned from the
date the claim arose, and at least to the date of presentation, by nation-
als of the state asserting the claim.
42
Two further United States' Executive Branch pronouncements on
the subject will suffice:
... the rule that this Government cannot undertake to prosecute claims
for indemnity against foreign governments unless the claimants are
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Lauterpacht, ed., 6th ed.) 314 ("... it may be stated as a general
principle that from the time of the occurrence of the injury until the making of the award
the claim must continuously and without interruption have belonged to a person or to a
series of persons who (a) have the nationality of the state by whom it is put forward, and
(b) do not have the nationality of the state against whom it is put forward."); CHARLES
HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES
893 (1945) ("A state should not undertake to press a claim for redress ia behalf of an in-
dividual against a foreign government, unless he was one of its own nationals both at the
time when the claim arose, and continuously thereafter."); MARJORIE WHITEMAN,
DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 96 (1937) ("A claim having its origin in an injury to an
individual must be national in origin, i.e., the injury must have been committed against
one who was a national of the claimant state at the date of the injury."); A.H. FELLER,
THE MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION 44-45 (1935) ("We have seen that under general
principles it is essential that the claim should have been a national one at its inception,").
See A Bill to Amend the International Claims Settlement Act of 19,9, As Amended.
Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on International Claims Legislation, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 58, 59-60 (1959) [hereinafter "ICSA Hearing"] where the above-referenced
State Department memorandum is reprinted in its entirety.
41. MS., Dep't of State, file 262.1141 Breger, Marcus/12-861, reprinted in 8
Whiteman DIGEST 1233.
42. ICSA Hearing, supra note 40, at 67.
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citizens of the United States would be applicable to the present case,
since the claimants, not being citizens of the United States, doubtless
were, at the time of the injuries complained of, subjects of Spain or of
some other government .... The acquisition of title to a government's
protection does not operate retroactively.
43
And, finally:
I feel constrained to say that the view you thus advocate can not be
admitted by this Department, it being conceded that the injury which
the claimant sets up was sustained and consummated during the period
when he was a German subject, and before he became a citizen of the
United States. 44
Two relatively recent corroborations of Executive Branch adherence
to the nationality of claims principle of public international law are pro-
vided by the examples of the Algiers Accords of 1981 and the investment
protection provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).
The Algiers Accords memorialized an agreement between the
United States and Iran that a tribunal would be created at the Hague "for
the purpose of deciding the claims of nationals of the United States
against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the United States ...
,45 Article VII of the Agreement defined "claims of nationals" to mean
only those claims, "owned continuously from the date on which the
claim arose .... by nationals of that state...
NAFTA contains specific investment protection provisions in the
event of expropriations of the "investment of an investor of another party
43. 230 MS. Dom. Let. 378 (1898), reprinted in MooRE, supra note 18, at 633,
where an Assistant Secretary of State explains that the United States would not espouse
the claims of Cubans for property destroyed by the Spanish government in Cuba. It is of
course an impermissible retroactivity of U.S. protection that is conferred upon Cuban
Americans by Title I of the Helms-Burton Act.
44. Acting Assistant Secretary of State Porter writing in 1887, reprinted in Moo.R.,
supra note 18, at 633.
45. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Alge-
ria Concerning the Settlement of Claims By the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 20 I.L.M. 224,230 (1981).
46. Id at 233.
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in its territory." 47 "Investor of another party" is defined as "a na-
tional.., of such party."
' 4
C. United States Judicial Branch Adherence to the Nationality of
Claims Principle of Public International Law
In De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, a U.S. federal ap-
peals court stated,
... there is a basic reason why Nicaragua's actions are not subject to
review.., it affected only a Nicaraguan national, Mrs. Sanchez. With
a few limited exceptions, international law delineates minimum stan-
dards for the protection only of aliens; it does not purport to interfere
with the relations between a nation and its own citizens. Thus, even if
Banco Central's actions might have violated international law had they
been taken with respect to an alien's property, the fact that they were
taken with respect to the... property rights of a Nicaraguan national
means that they were outside the ambit of international law.
49
Even in cases where plaintiffs have demonstrated a genuine hard-
ship arising from their government's taking of their property the courts
nonetheless have recognized the duty to uphold the integrity of interna-
tional law against the temptation to provide ad hoc remedies without le-
gal basis. Bank Tejarat v. Varsho-Saz, was such a case. An Iranian citi-
zen claimed that his property had been "wrongfully and fraudulently
confiscated by the Iranian government." The court held,
While such an act may offend our notions of justice, see U.S. Const.
Amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation"), the taking by a government of the property of one
of [its] citizens, located within its territory, does not constitute a viola-
tion of international law. 50
Finally, a federal court in F. Palacio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush,
held, in a case involving Cuban former owners of cigar manufacturing
enterprises in Cuba, that ".... confiscations by a state of the property of
its own nationals, no matter how flagrant and regardless of whether
47. See NAFMA, supra note 16, at art. 1101 et seq.
48. Id. atart. 1139.
49. See 770 F.2d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir. 1985).
50. See 723 F. Supp. 516 (C.D.Cal. 1989).
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compensation has been provided, do not constitute violations of interna-
tional law." 5
V. The United States is "Estopped" from Supporting the
Claims of Non-U.S. Nationals at Time of Property Losses in
Cuba
The estoppel principle in international law may be stated as follows:
A State which has by declaration and conduct maintained a position
which is manifestly contrary to the right it then claims with respect to
another State is precluded from claiming that right.
52
The International Court of Justice has stated that the "...primary
foundation of this principle is the good faith that must prevail in interna-
tional relations, in as much as inconsistency of conduct or opinion on the
part of a state to the prejudice of another is incompatible with good
faith."5
3
As we have seen, the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
the U.S. government have, until last year when the Helms-Burton Act
became law, been undeviating in their adherence to the nationality of
claims principle of international law. It follows inescapably that the in-
clusion of Cuban American claims in Titles IMI and IV of the Helms-
Burton Act constitutes nothing less than an act of bad faith on the part of
the United States in its relations with other nations and it is, as a matter
of international law, estopped from lending support to such claims.
Estoppel also pertains to any assertion that U.S. support for Cuban
American claims against Cuba is justified under the international law of
human rights. On June 11, 1997 an op-ed piece by Edwin D. William-
son, a former legal advisor at the State Department under President Bush,
appeared in the Washington Times.m In his piece Mr. Williamson makes
51. See 256 F. Supp. 481 at 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), afd 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.
1967). See also Chudian v. Philippine National Bank, 912 F. 2d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir.
1990); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F. 2d 24, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1974).
52. Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, (Cambodia v. Thail.) 1962 ICJ
Reports 40. The operative principle is described variously as preclusion in French, es-
toppel in English and the doctrina de los actosproprios in Spanish.
53. Il at 42.
54. Edwin D. Williamson, Protecting Everyone's Right to Property, WAsH. TMEs,
June 11, 1997, at A21.
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several statements concerning something he calls "property rights." He
begins by describing these rights as "internationally recognized." How-
ever, it turns out that these "rights" are not, in fact, very widely recog-
nized at all, because Mr. Williamson says later in his article that a treaty
between the United States and the European Union is necessary to "es-
tablish... international legal rules recognizing and protecting property
rights. 55 In truth, a treaty between the United States and the European
Union will not codify international "rules" concerning property
"rights-it will invent a set of such rules. Mr. Williamson confirms that
this is the case elsewhere in his piece when he says that a treaty is
"sorely needed because the international recognition of property rights
lags behind the recognition of other rights. 56
The American Law Institute thoroughly considered the question of
property as a human right when it revised the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States in 1984.57
In the end the Restatement settled, at Section 702, on the following
rights under the heading "Customary International Law of Human
Rights," declaring that:
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it prac-
55. Id. (emphasis added). The impetus for the treaty negotiations between the U.S.
and the European Union ("E.U.") over the issue of property "rights" was the European
Union's filing in October 1996 of a complaint at the World Trade Organization
("WTO"). The European Union's complaint arose from the passage by the United States
of the Helms-Burton Act in March, 1996. On April 11, 1997 the E.U. agreed to suspend
its WTO complaint and to negotiate with the U.S. "disciplines" to "inhibit and deter" in-
vestments in properties "expropriated or nationalized.. .in contravention of international
law." See European Union-United States: Memorandum of Understanding Concerning
the U.S. Helms-Burton Act and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (Apr. 11, 1997),
36 IL.M. 529 (1997). Once such disciplines are in place and the European Union is
seen to be adhering to them, Congress is expected to give the president the authority to
waive Title IV exclusions with respect to European nationals. In fact, if the European
Union does prohibit investment in certain properties in Cuba by European nationals,
there will really be no further need for Title IV with respect to such Europeans, so
Europe will gain nothing from the "waiver" of Title IV.
56. Williamson, supra note 54, at A21.
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
702 (1987). It should be remembered that the Restatement is not meant to be merely an
expression of United States' opinion or position on a particular issue of international
law. The Restatement, by its own terms, "represents the opinion of the American Law
Institute as to the rules that an impartial tribunal would apply if charged with deciding a
controversy in accordance with international law." (Emphasis added). Id. at 3.
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tices, encourages or condones
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights.
Plainly absent from Section 702's list of human rights violations are
deprivations of property. In 1982 at the Annual Meeting of the Ameri-
can Law Institute, Monroe Leigh made a motion to include property
rights within Section 702's list of human rights that are protected by
customary international law. The following response was made by Pro-
fessor Louis Henkin:
[S]tates have not accepted as a matter of customary law as regards their
own nationals the same right of property that they are prepared to in-
clude in covenants and that they are prepared to apply to foreign na-
tionals. That is the key distinction. States are prepared, we believe, to
accept the right of property for foreign nationals. They have not been
prepared to accept it as a matter of customary law for their own nation-
als.. .The notion that we can declare to be customary that which the
world has not accepted as customary law seems to be going pretty far.
It would be a serious mistake for us to adopt this motion. 53
Immediately after Professor Henkin finished speaking, Mr. Leigh's
motion was resoundingly defeated.59
Conclusion
In order to achieve a foreign policy objective with respect to Cuba,
Congress violated the nationality of claims principle of public interna-
tional law. As a matter of urgency, the Helms-Burton Act must be
amended to remedy that violation. If the United States persists in a con-
tinuing breach of international law it will undermine the global rule of
58. 58 A.L.I. Proc. 216-217, 221 (1982).
59. Id.
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law to the detriment of the citizens of this country. How, after all, can
the United States demand compliance with international law by other
nations when it is in violation of that very system of law? The short and
obvious answer is that it cannot.
